Have you heard? A new generation of robots may be just around the corner. As the ScienceDaily piece words it:
The first prototype robots capable of developing emotions as they interact with their human caregivers and expressing a whole range of emotions have been finalised by researchers. [link; all emphases mine]
Robots developing emotion? Isn’t that somehow oxymoronic? Robots are machines and machines don’t have feelings. Right?
More about the breakthrough machines robots:
The robots are capable of expressing anger, fear, sadness, happiness, excitement and pride and will demonstrate very visible distress if the caregiver fails to provide them comfort when confronted by a stressful situation that they cannot cope with or to interact with them when they need it.
Oh boy. Pardon my emotional reaction here, but . . . crap. I’m having trouble coping right now. There is just so much to this topic to be skeptical about. And there certainly is that crucial element that, when pushed to it’s logical extreme, challenges my own understanding of being and self.
First off, human emotion is tremendously complex. An “emotion” can include a few or most of the following incomplete list of changes to: facial expression, gestural expression, vocal qualities, posture, muscle tone, heart rate, blood pressure, hormone and neurotransmitter levels, blood flow to specific regions of the brain resulting in what has been called a “priming” of types of memories/thoughts, etc.
Beyond the measurable, physical changes, emotions are a social phenomenon. Only social animals develop and express emotions. It seems the development in robots has smartly focused on this social aspect. But it’s the personal element that I wonder about. And this is the element we can’t really verify. Not now.
Consider this claim from the write-up:
[T]hese robots differ from others in the way that they form attachments, interact and express emotion through bodily expression.
Sure, they may seem to form attachments. But are they only “going through the motions”? Are these robots merely very good mimics?
Granted, they may be a real step in the direction of creating “beings” that learn and respond on many levels, just as we do. Machines that can have motives and undergo fluctuations in their intent and energy level, among other things. And as these robots develop, thinkers like you and I will be forced to wonder when mimicry crosses the line to a “real” thing.
Sure, humans are made of flesh, and robots are not. But when it comes down to the very nitty-gritty, are we not just incredibly elaborate meat machines? In suspecting that robots could never have true emotions, am I merely being xenophobic; is my innate instinct to be alarmed by potential deceit (as all we hyper-social primates are) merely being triggered? Don’t be fooled by the robot! It isn’t really a person. It is deceiving you!
At this point in time, I have very strong doubts about robots developing what we might call true emotion. But I don’t know. When I think about it . . . Why not? No, we aren’t talking about an evil engineer using a syringe to magically inject a soul into his contraption of sheet metal, stainless steel bolts, and tangles of wire. It’s much more complicated than that.
And soul, what is that? I don’t believe in it. Not as something distinct from the workings of an animal body. But what about the personal part. That dynamic but not fully plastic, distinct agency we perceive as “soul,” as an individual’s persisting essence?
I don’t know.
And frankly, I’m a bit confused as to why anyone would want to develop or own such a robot. Still. With the progressive development of these . . . machines many, many important questions are being raised.
This study on painkillers blunting social pain screams for follow-up. But it intrigues nonetheless:
Over-the-counter painkiller may help ease emotional slights, UF study finds
Why does it scream? No, not for lack of emotion-easing acetaminophen. Because it was one study with a limited number of subjects. And I’m not sure about the measure of the second variable. The social pain part. Here’s some of the specifics -
By random assignment, nearly half the participants, 24 women and six men, took a 500-mg pill of acetaminophen immediately after waking up each day and another 500-mg pill one hour before going to sleep, while 24 women and eight men took a placebo. Each night the participants filled out a survey to assess their level of hurt feelings during the day.
Throughout the three weeks, those who took acetaminophen reported significantly fewer hurt feelings on average than participants in the placebo group, Webster said. In addition, they showed much less activity in areas of the brain linked with emotional feelings, such as hurt and rejection, he said.
Random assignment . . . placebo group. Good. But what is “significantly fewer hurt feelings” — in other words, how large was the effect — and how was it measured? The “much less activity in areas of the brain” was gauged via use of fMRI technology. So that seem solid. But it brings to mind another question: Was the reading of the fMRI scans blinded?
One thing I don’t question much, to quote study co-author Gregory Webster, is “[t]he possibility of this link between physical and social pain systems.” That possibility is highly plausible, judging by what is already understood about human psychology and physiology. Yes, as Webster pointed out, “we live in a dualistic society where people see the mind and body as being very separate.” But that’s changing. I think. I hope.
Word choice. So important. Not just to advertising companies and politicians. Scientists and science writers should likewise pay attention to the words they use. Not because they want the most bang for their syllables, but because words can be misleading. Inaccurate. They can slant and spin the issue. And no good scientist wants that. Does she?
Two recent news releases about research into religious matters set off the language-police siren in my mind. Oh sure, the perceived mis-use of language may seem slight . . . but the smallest turn of a vehicle steering wheel can add up to a big influence. By “vehicle,” I’m talking public perception.
The first I encountered over at ScienceDaily: Doctors’ Religious Beliefs Strongly Influence End-of-Life Decisions, Study Finds
The finding, as worded in the lead . . .
Atheist or agnostic doctors are almost twice as willing to take decisions that they think will hasten the end of a very sick patient’s life as doctors who are deeply religious, suggests research published online in the Journal of Medical Ethics. [emphases added]
Interesting.
Word choice question #1: Why take decisions and the the customary make decisions? Seems to have more radical connotations to me.
Word choice question #2: Why the following switch-a-roo with terms?
And doctors with a strong faith are less likely to discuss this type of treatment with the patient concerned, the research shows.
I thought the variable in question was religious belief. Why the use of strong faith? That term seems to have slightly different connotations. Will it steer people’s perceptions away from the bedrock of the more scientific elements? I wonder.
In the following sentence we do not see the same type of verbal polish applied to the other extreme:
But irrespective of specialty, doctors who described themselves as “extremely” or “very non-religious” were almost twice as likely to report having taken these kinds of decisions as those with a religious belief.
Why not refer to these individuals as “doctors with fully naturalistic worldviews” (or some shorter alternative)? And why was the adverb extremely applied only to the strongly non-religious? Why not extremely religious? Hmm. Extreme seems to have negative connotations.
The final sentence pulls yet another verbal switch:
The author concludes that the relationship between doctors’ values and their clinical decision making needs to be acknowledged much more than it is at present.
Wait. I thought we were talking religious beliefs and lack thereof. How did values get in there? Granted, they probably do play a role. But good science and science writing plays no such shell games; it makes clear when it has veered away from the research results into a more speculative area.
As for the values and decision-making, I can hear some folk spinning the finding now. Non-religious doctors, you know, atheists, do not value human life like religious doctors do, thus they are more likely to pull the plug and or let their patients die.
That would be quite a spin. For another possible interpretation might be: Non-religious doctors feel freer to heed the wishes of their patients and/or to help ease their suffering by allowing a quicker, less painful death. Or something.
Yet another spin: The beliefs of strongly religious doctors cause them to ignore the patient’s needs and suffering at end-of-life.
Words. How you use them makes a world of difference. They can paint a picture that may inaccurately reflect the complex truth of an issue.
The second article a ran into over at EurekAlert — Study: Generation X more loyal to religion. Notice in the following how the choice of just one word can have such important connotations.
As Generation X continues to grow older, this loyalty may translate into a more stable nation in terms of its religiosity, he said.
A stable nation. Stability is good, right? What if the word had been static? What if the the words were, “may translate into a less dynamic nation”? Or “less progressive”?
Okay, I’ll shut down my verbal radar and quiet the siren. For now. Maybe the above is much ado about little. But then again, maybe it isn’t.
[recycled post, with a few text edits; original here]
Hmm. Was I wrong in concluding that St. John’s Wort was little more than placebo? (Mind you, I have been wrong before and will be wrong again.) I had come to that conclusion after encountering and reading a well-designed and controlled study conducted in the good ole U.S. of A.
So I was a bit surprised when my eyes hit upon this headline: St. John’s Wort Relieves Symptoms Of Major Depression, Study Shows. The article states:
New research provides support for the use of St. John’s wort extracts in treating major depression. A Cochrane Systematic Review backs up previous research that showed the plant extract is effective in treating mild to moderate depressive disorders.
“Overall, we found that the St. John’s wort extracts tested in the trials were superior to placebos and as effective as standard antidepressants, with fewer side effects,” says lead researcher, Klaus Linde of the Centre for Complementary Medicine in Munich, Germany.
Hmm. The “new research,” was a systematic review of previously conducted research. In other words, the new research wasn’t a meta-analysis, which itself would necessitate a grain of salt to accept. It was a “Chochrane Systematic Review.” What, pray tell, is that? As far as I can tell it is a methodological review of research findings contained in the Chochrane database. The method employed depends upon the author. Interestingly, nearly all of the positive studies were conducted in Germany. Why is that?
Alright, so maybe I’ll refine my conclusion. St. John’s Wort may be effective, but the jury is still out.
Here are a couple questions I have.
1) Does it matter that the reviewer is from the “Centre for Complementary Medicine in Munich, Germany”? (Maybe?)
2) How is this complimentary medicine? Rename St. John’s Wort as, say, hyperizoft (i.e. tag the extract of the active ingredient — Hypericum perforatum — with a pharma-sounding name, and would one continue to believe this type of medicine belongs in a distinct category?
Acupuncture works. Kindof. Multiple studies have determined it is as effective as “sham acupuncture.” But no more. Sham acupuncture is basically false acupuncture — it ignores the supposed energy meridians and there is no actual puncturing of the skin. Envision toothpicks pressed on random spots.
A new study on acupuncture sheds light on both how it doesn’t work and how it succeeds in eliciting a placebo-like response.
In the ScienceDaily post, Acupuncture Not Superior to Sham Acupuncture in Knee Osteoarthritis, Study Finds, I learned -
Researchers from MD Anderson Cancer Center determined patients with osteoarthritis (OA) of the knee who are treated with traditional Chinese acupuncture (TCA) do not experience any more benefit than those receiving sham acupuncture (placebo). The team did find that the communication style of the acupuncturist could have a significant effect on pain reduction and satisfaction in patients….
A total of 455 knee OA patients received either TCA or sham acupuncture treatments and 72 healthy controls were included. Acupuncturists were trained to interact in 1 of 2 communication styles — high (“I’ve had a lot of success with treating knee pain”) or neutral (“It may or may not work for you”) expectations. Patients were then randomized and nested within 1 of 3 style groups — waiting list, high, or neutral….
The team found significant differences in J-MAP pain reduction (0.25) and satisfaction (0.22) for those patients in the high expectations group compared with the neutral group.[emphases added]
In other words, it is looking like that when acupuncture does work, it is not the voodoo of sticking pins in magic chi-releasing, yin-and-yang balancing points — as the dogma asserts — but upon the expectations of the patient and how these may be influenced by the “bedside manner” of the practitioner of this pseudo-scientific modality.
The most interesting part of the study, for me, was the effect of “communication styles.” I wonder, does a doctor provide better treatment — in the short term it should be noted — by engaging in behavior that borders on salesmanship? Is it the better salesmanship of the practitioners of alternative medicines that people are drawn to?
I’ve had a lot of success with this. Statements like that are a lot more conducive to hopeful feelings than, say, Studies have determined that for people in your condition this treatment is 38% effective of a five year period.
Hmm. Should this type of soft salesmanship be part of a doctor’s modus operandi? I wonder.
Are atheists less patriotic than believers? And, if so, is this a bad thing?
As to the first question, it seems so. At least a recent study finding suggests as much. The first paragraph of the news release sums it up:
A study by Ryotaro Uemura, sociology doctoral student at Indiana University Bloomington, found that people who had no religious affiliation have significantly less favorable views of the U.S. However, to be an ethnic minority does not necessarily have significant effects on national attitudes.
Wow. Have the FOX talking-heads been right all along? Are we godless liberals going to drive the country off the closest cliff? Do we really hate America?
First, a little more specificity:
Uemura also found that to be non-citizens does not have a significant effect on national pride; this suggests that non-citizens are as proud of the U.S. as are citizens.
Okay, if you think about it, a lot of questions come cascading, beyond the customary, “Is this finding legit.”
Is national pride the same thing as patriotism?
Is it possible to have less favorable views of your country but love and/or care for it as much?
Should FOX pundits direct their ire away from immigrants and Muslims toward non-believers?
Would it be advantageous/accurate to to view these findings in the light of feelings of group belonging and acceptance?
And then there is this:
As for ethnic subgroups, blacks tend to have less favorable views compared to their white counterparts.
Not surprising, but . . . more questions.
We human beings tend to explain differences in behavior by pointing toward dispositional attributes. It’s easy; it’s quick. One person does good things because he/she is a hero, another person does bad things because he/she is evil. Or unpatriotic. What goes missing are the many other, essential variables. Digging deeper to expose the actual psychological mechanisms would better explain our differences. Until that time, I try to steer clear of blanket dispositional-think.
